New Ideas on Normativity

Norms are constraints on actions, beliefs, or intentions. They guide us, among other things, in satisfying desires, in being morally upright, or in acquiring knowledge. However, it is not easy to see what different kinds of norms there are, how different kinds of norms are linked to each other, and how we should deal with norm conflicts. In particular, so-called epistemic norms, which somehow pertain to the formation, maintenance, or revision of beliefs, are in many ways hard to align with moral or prudential norms, which concern more practical matters.

At the conference, we will discuss novel insights and ideas on questions like the following:

• How do norms, reasons, and values relate to each other? Are they rooted in our actual aims and desires, or are they largely independent of what we in fact feel and want?
• How do moral, prudential, epistemic, and other kinds of norms relate to each other? For instance, do we have non-moral and non-prudential reasons to comply with epistemic norms, or are epistemic norms merely instrumentalist in the sense that they depend on non-epistemic aims?
• What kinds of norms govern such activities as making assertions or inquiring into the truth of some proposition? More generally, to what activities do moral, prudential, and epistemic norms respectively extend?
• Is there a way to balance norms of different kinds, and if yes, how? Is there something like an all-things-considered ought, and if yes, how can it integrate moral, prudential, social, and epistemic requirements?
• When are we to blame for violating norms? Is there a distinctive epistemic kind of blame? And what are the interrelations between blame, responsibility, and direct voluntary control over actions, intentions, and beliefs?
• Are our most essential norms internalist (subjectivist) or externalist (objectivist) requirements? How much internalism is needed to preserve their guidance function, and how much externalism is needed to deal with otherwise counterintuitive consequences?

Keynote Speakers:

Arianna Falbo (Toronto Metropolitan University)
Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki)
Kate Nolfi (University of Vermont)
Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Aarhus University)

Submissions:

In addition to keynote presentations, there will be six to eight slots for contributed papers. Each slot will be allocated 60 minutes, divided equally between presentation and discussion. Please submit an anonymized PDF file containing an extended abstract (max. 1,000 words) to marc.andree.webermail-uni-mannheim.de. 

Deadline: Oct. 31, 2025

Notification of Acceptance: Nov. 15, 2025

Location:

University of Mannheim, Schloss, EO 242

Organization:

PD Dr. Marc Andree Weber

This conference is part of the project The Moral Dimension of Doxastic Norms, which is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

Registration:

If you like to participate, please register here. Participation is free of charge.