PD Dr. Marc Andree Weber

Marc Andree Weber is an Academic Staff Member at the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy/Philosophy of Language at the University of Mannheim. Since October 2021, he is doing research on the ethics of belief within the DFG-funded project The Moral Dimension of Doxastic Norms.

In 2022 and 2023, he was interim professor for theoretical philosophy, first at Heidelberg University and then at Hamburg University. From 2017 to 2018, he worked as an Assistant Professor at the Chair of Epistemology and Theory of Science at the University College Freiburg. Before that, he was a member of the interdisciplinary research projects “Dealing Reasonably with Blurred Boundaries” and “Deep Disagreements”.

Marc Andree Weber studied Mathematics and Philosophy in Heidelberg and Melbourne. He earned his PhD in 2011 with a thesis on the transtemporal identity of persons. In 2019, he completed his habilitation with a thesis on the epistemic significance of disagreement (for an easy introduction to the central problem, see here). 

He is fascinated by all areas of theoretical philosophy, especially by topics in metaphysics and epistemology. More specifically, he has primarily focused on the metaphysics of persons, the phenomenon of vagueness, the epistemological problems of disagreements, and the norms of belief.

In his teaching, Marc Andree Weber often addresses topics that go beyond his areas of research. For example, he regularly holds seminars on political philosophy, logic, and early modern philosophy.

• [2019a] Meinungsverschiedenheiten. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Analyse. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann (Philosophische Abhandlungen, Bd. 118).
  
  For book reviews, see
  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68.6 (2020), 977–82.
  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 74.3 (2020), 477–81.
  Widerspruch. Münchener Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69 (2020), 99–102. 
   
• [2019b] Edmund L. Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? / Ist wahre, gerechtfertigte Überzeugung Wissen? Edited and translated together with Nadja-Mira Yolcu. Reclam.
• [2014] Die Zerlegung des Ichs. Über die Grundlagen personaler Identität. Münster: Mentis.

• [2024a] The Astute and the Kindly Ones. Epistemological Remarks on Disagreements in Politics and Law. Grazer Philosophische Studien 101.1, 1–27.
• [2024b] Lug und Selbstbetrug. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 72.3, 323–343.
• [2024c] An Argument for Moral Evidentialism. Theoria 90.6, 583–602.
• [2023] Unknown Peers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31.3, 382–401. (joint second runner-up at PERITIA Essay Prize 2023)
•  [2022] Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition. Kriterion 36.1, 33–50.
• [2021a] Sind Gedankenexperimente in der praktischen Philosophie besonders?  Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 8.2, 247–276.
• [2019c] “The Relevance of Philosophical Theories of Vagueness to Legal Interpretation.” Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science 48,  212–24.
• [2017a] “Epistemic Peerhood, Likelihood, and Equal Weight.” Logos & Episteme 8.3, 307–44.
• [2017b] “Armchair Disagreement.” Metaphilosophy 48.4, 527–49.
• [2017c] “Die Aussagekraft wirklichkeitsferner Gedankenexperimente für Theorien personaler Identität.” In: A. Oberprantacher und A. Siegetsleitner (eds.), Mensch sein – Fundament, Imperativ oder Floskel? Beiträge zum 10. Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie (pp. 493–503). Innsbruck: IUP.
• [2017d] “Zwölf Antworten auf Williams' Paradox.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 71.1, 128–54.
• [2016]  “The Non-Conservativeness of Legal Definitions.” In: G. Keil and R. Poscher (eds.), Vagueness and Law. Philosophical and Legal Perspectives (pp. 189–203). Oxford: OUP.
• [2015]  “Baker's First-person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem.” Phenomenology and Mind 7, 158–68.
• [2013a]  “Die Irrelevanz personaler Identität für praktische Belange.” In: G. Gasser and M. Schmidhuber (eds.),  Personale Identität, Narrativität und Praktische Rationalität (pp. 313–35). Münster: Mentis.
• [2013b]   “Interrelations and Dissimilarities Between Distinct Approaches to Ontic Vagueness.” Metaphysica 14.2, 181–95.