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Maximilian Philipps, M.A.

Maximilian Philipps, M.A.

Doctoral student
University of Mannheim
Lehrstuhl Philosophie I
L 9, 5 – Room 002
68161 Mannheim

Maximilian Philipps is a doctoral student at the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy/Philosophy of Language. Before progressing to his doctoral studies, he studied Philosophy, Business and Media- and Communication Science at the University of Mannheim. His research interests focus on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein on which he wrote several student papers as well as a final thesis on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. His dissertation, which is connected to the chair’s research project „Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism”, deals with Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. It focuses on the expressivist tendencies in this late part of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. 


Publications

2024: “Wittgenstein über Gesichtsraum und Grammatik.” In Facetten der Wirklichkeit – Zeitgenössische Debatten: Beiträge des 45. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums, herausgegeben von Yannic Kappes, Asya Passinsky, Julio De Rizzo und Benjamin Schnieder, Band XXX. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.


Dissertationsprojekt

  • Expression games. The notion of expression in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology

    Maximilian Philipps

    Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag, Chair of Philosophy I

    My dissertation deals with Wittgenstein‘s discussion of the expression of mental states through a speaker’s verbal or nonverbal behavior. The focus on the analysis lies on so-called avowals like “I am in pain.”

    I share the view that Wittgenstein, through his analysis of such sentences, can be seen as a pioneer of psychological expressivism.. Moreover, I argue that key motifs of his later work, like the impossibility of a private language, the rule-following problem, or the phenomenon of aspect perception, can be integrated into an inherently expressivist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work.

    My main thesis is that Wittgenstein doesn’t see the expression of mental state as a phenomenon that depends on the presence of mental states in the subject’s mind, but rather as one that relies on the presence of an expression game: an intersubjective context in which actions gain their expressive significance, thereby becoming adequate vehicles for expressing mental states.