Workshops und Tagungen


Varieties of Philosophical Expressivism

Internationale Konferenz

*ABGESAGT AUFGRUND DER COVID-19 KRISE. INFORMATIONEN ÜBER EINEN NEUEN TERMIN FOLGEN, SOBALD PLANUNGEN WIEDER MÖGLICH SIND.*

14.-16. Mai 2020
Universität Mannheim
O 138 Fuchs-Petrolub-Festsaal
Schloss Ostflügel, 1. Stock

 

In the last decades, philosophers have become increasingly interested in expressivist views within various subfields such as ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of law. What unites these views is the idea that affirmations about a certain subject matter are not, or not primarily, descriptions of an underlying reality, but serve to express the speakers’ mental states. It is, however, a controversial matter what this means exactly and what it implies. What are the formal, what are the logical properties of the notion of expression? Can one express a mental state one does not possess? And what, if any, are the semantic, what are the pragmatic consequences of adopting an expressivist position? For example, are there any genuinely expressivist views that can plausibly be combined with classical truth-value semantics, and if so, are they restricted to specific classes of claims?

In the conference, we aim at identifying structural similarities (as well as differences) between the distinct strands of expressivism in order to shed light on, among other things, the notion of expression, the conceptual and semantic challenges that expressivists face, and the merits and drawbacks of expressivist theories in general.  

 

Bestätigte SprecherInnen: 
Stephen Barker
Felix Bräuer
Joachim Bromand
Matthew Chrisman
Stephen Finlay
Wolfgang Freitag
Vera Flocke
Luca Incurvati
Teresa Marques
Christa Peterson
Benjamin Schnieder
Mark Schroeder
Michael Scott
Jack Woods
Nadja-Mira Yolcu

 

Die Konferenz wird von Mitgliedern des Projekts Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism organisiert.

 


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  • Perspectives on First-Person Thought

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    Weitere Infos finden Sie hier

     

     

     

     

    Is there anything special about the way we think about ourselves, and in particular about our own inner world? It is sometimes said that thoughts about our own conscious states involve a kind of awareness that is fundamentally different from the one that comes with other thoughts. It is also often held that we cannot misrepresent the subject of our current expreriences, and that this phenomenon must be explained by an adequate theory of first-person thought. Yet it is difficult to discern what exactly these claims entail. Moreover, there is no unconctroversial way to relate phenomena of first-person thought to phenomena of first-person speech. When we utter self-ascriptions of mental states, do we thereby simply report in which state we are, or do we rather directly express the respective state?
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