14.-16. Mai 2020
O 138 Fuchs-Petrolub-Festsaal
Schloss Ostflügel, 1. Stock
In the last decades, philosophers have become increasingly interested in expressivist views within various subfields such as ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of law. What unites these views is the idea that affirmations about a certain subject matter are not, or not primarily, descriptions of an underlying reality, but serve to express the speakers’ mental states. It is, however, a controversial matter what this means exactly and what it implies. What are the formal, what are the logical properties of the notion of expression? Can one express a mental state one does not possess? And what, if any, are the semantic, what are the pragmatic consequences of adopting an expressivist position? For example, are there any genuinely expressivist views that can plausibly be combined with classical truth-value semantics, and if so, are they restricted to specific classes of claims?
In the conference, we aim at identifying structural similarities (as well as differences) between the distinct strands of expressivism in order to shed light on, among other things, the notion of expression, the conceptual and semantic challenges that expressivists face, and the merits and drawbacks of expressivist theories in general.
Die Konferenz wird von Mitgliedern des Projekts Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism organisiert.
Das Berliner Forum ist ein Netzwerk zur Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, das bereits seit mehr als zehn Jahren besteht. Zu dem Forum kommen etwa einmal im Jahr Promovierende und Postdocs verschiedener Disziplinen in einer offenen Arbeitsatmosphäre zusammen, um sich über ihre aktuellen Forschungsarbeiten, -entwürfe und konzeptionelle Ideen in gemeinsamer Runde auszutauschen. Ziel des Berliner Forums ist es, Argumentationslinien und Beiträge zu normativen Fragen wirtschaftlichen Handelns aus unterschiedlichen Forschungsperspektiven unter Promovierenden und Habilitierenden zu diskutieren. In den Dialog treten dabei Philosophen, Ökonomen, Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethiker gleichermaßen, um Themen, die unter den Schlagwörtern CSR und Nachhaltigkeit sowie in der Unternehmens- und Wirtschaftsethik verhandelt werden, zu erörtern. Die Teilnahme ist mit Vortrag oder als Diskutant/
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Is there anything special about the way we think about ourselves, and in particular about our own inner world? It is sometimes said that thoughts about our own conscious states involve a kind of awareness that is fundamentally different from the one that comes with other thoughts. It is also often held that we cannot misrepresent the subject of our current expreriences, and that this phenomenon must be explained by an adequate theory of first-person thought. Yet it is difficult to discern what exactly these claims entail. Moreover, there is no unconctroversial way to relate phenomena of first-person thought to phenomena of first-person speech. When we utter self-ascriptions of mental states, do we thereby simply report in which state we are, or do we rather directly express the respective state?
Our aim in this conference is to bring together researchers – including philosophers, linguists, and psychologists – who will address and dicuss these and other problems relating to first-person thought and the way it is articulated in speech.
The conference will be the concluding event of the project The First Person – Semantic, Epistemic, and Scientific Perspectives (PI: Prof. Dr. Katharina Kraus, University of Notre Dame) and the inaugural conference of the project Mind the Meaning: The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism (PI: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag).
We often suspend belief. Some questions we haven't considered yet, others are still under investigation, and yet others seem to allow for no definite answer. We often withhold belief and, more importantly, we do so rationally. Despite its core role in our doxastic everyday life, suspension of belief has not received much attention in the epistemological literature, which has mainly focused on positive belief alone. The conference will fill this lacuna and investigate the nature and rational profile of suspension of belief.