Forschung am LS Philosophie I

Der Forschungs­schwerpunkt des Lehr­stuhls Philosophie I (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag) liegt im Bereich Theoretische Philosophie, insbesondere Sprachphilosophie, Er­kenntnistheorie, Metaphysik und Wissenschafts­theorie. Die frühe Analytische Philosophie bildet einen historischen Schwerpunkt. 

Aktuelles Forschungs­projekt

Mind the Meaning

The Philosophy of Psychological Expressivism


  • Expressing Myself: Disavowals and the Mind (working title)

    Nadja-Mira Yolcu

    Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag, Lehr­stuhl Philosophie I

    The dissertation project aims to develop an expressivist analysis for the negation of avowals. So far, expressivist theories (Wittgenstein 1953; Bar-On 2004, 2015; Finkelstein 2003; Freitag 2014, 2018) have focused on positive avowals. But negated avowals (disavowals), e.g., “I don’t hope that it is raining,” pose, or seem to pose, a serious problem to avowal expressivism. It is unclear what the utterance of a negated avowal is supposed to express – how can one express the absence of a mental state? The purpose of the dissertation is to examine negated avowals. I will tentatively claim that, in spite of the mentioned problem, they can receive an expressivist interpretation. I propose that disavowals constitute cases of expressive denegation. Thus, we can avoid a descriptivist backlash. An expressivist interpretation of disavowals will, furthermore, contribute to a new understanding of various philosophical problems such as Moore’s paradox and suspension of belief.

  • Scientific Observation in Perspective (working title)

    Lyu Xingyu

    Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Freitag, Lehr­stuhl Philosophie I

    The dissertation project aims to develop a perspectivist account of scientific observation. The observational ability of human observers has been profoundly enlarged and enhanced with the aid of sophisticatedly designed apparatus. Whether the observational results gained via the use of apparatus could be treated as the outcome of a simple continuum of human sensory perception or not, determines how we interpret observational results in science. I will respond to this question from a perspectivist viewpoint and will thus argue that there is no simple continuum thereof. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a perspectivist theoretical framework with the aim of bridging the gap between the apparatus-based observation and human sense-based observation.